

CHAPTER XVII

THE 2ND BRIGADE ON THE "400 PLATEAU"

WHEN the order was given which sent forward Salisbury's line, no one could have had any conception of the chain of events which was to follow it. MacLagan had long since had it in mind that, when the 2nd Brigade arrived, the advance of the 3rd could be resumed without undue risk. After advancing his headquarters across Shrapnel Gully, he had not been long in getting the strings of the situation into his hands. Reports, excellently lucid, were coming in from both officers and men in charge of advanced parties. Even he who had trained them was surprised at the regularity with which this information arrived. He could see Turks on the Third ridge, and they presently appeared there in numbers—judged to be between 2,000 and 3,000. To MacLagan it had seemed obviously unsafe to continue the advance against the Third ridge while such slender numbers were reaching the Second, and with no troops at all on his right. His first decision, therefore, had been that the 3rd Brigade should dig in temporarily, and reorganise on the Second ridge until the 2nd Brigade arrived; and that, when the 2nd Brigade came up, the 3rd should resume the advance against the Third ridge.

Now, at 9 a.m., when the advanced parties reported that the Turks were pushing forward and trying to outflank them on the north, the 2nd Australian Brigade was already coming up in strength behind MacLagan's right. He had therefore found it possible to order the further advance of Salisbury's line.

Scarcely had that line gone forward, when MacLagan made the third important decision affecting this portion of the front. From the time he left Plugge's it had been his intention to fix his headquarters eventually on MacLaurin's Hill, north of Wire Gully. The signallers with the headquarters telephone had been sent there direct from Plugge's while MacLagan and Ross moved across to the 400 Plateau. After ordering Salisbury forward, MacLagan made his way to the third position. Colonel Weir of the 10th informed him, on

the strength of the reports from his advanced parties, that there was no hope of the 10th Battalion seizing the guns on the Third ridge which were part of its objective. MacLagan was still more impressed by observing that, in consequence of the difficulties of the route and the fire upon Plugge's, barely a quarter of the men who left Plugge's arrived on his side of the valley. The parties appeared to him to be split up and drawn into other parts of the line than those where he most needed them.

From that moment MacLagan gave up all idea of reaching the objective on that day. But the Second ridge, on which the line was then situated, formed a tenable position. He therefore ordered it to dig in there, and sent word to Major Brand, out on Lone Pine, informing him of this, and instructing him to withdraw all advanced parties to the main firing line.

This was MacLagan's final decision concerning the line on the 400 Plateau. Having given it, he turned all his attention to what from that moment he realised to be the key of the position—Baby 700. From his third headquarters, on MacLaurin's Hill, he could see Baby 700 three-quarters of a mile to his left spanning the head of Monash Valley. It directly overlooked that gully, behind the Second ridge on which his line lay. Along the bottom of Monash Valley was the only possible route for communications to the troops lining its edge, and unless Baby 700 were taken and held, the Turks would look straight down upon those communications at a few hundred yards' range. MacLagan henceforth concentrated all his efforts upon sending reinforcements up to the battle which he could see sweeping to and fro over the summit of Baby 700. The position on the 400 Plateau had been settled, so far as he was concerned, by his decision that the troops there could penetrate no further than the Second ridge, and by his order to dig in upon it.

But this order, so simple in its terms, was far from simple in fulfilment. The carrying out of an operation in battle depends upon the existence of an organised line or body of troops to which the command can be communicated, and which can be controlled in the performance. But Salisbury's portion of the line had now disappeared into the terrible fire which swept the breast-high scrub of the plateau. From this time

until the end of the day, while the rest of the line was fairly definite, there existed on the 400 Plateau a gap which had an immense influence upon the course of the battle.

On either side of this gap the line was definite and stationary. At the northern end of the plateau, where the left of the 10th Battalion rested, MacLagan's order had its intended effect. The 10th, backed by a machine-gun of the 11th, formed there the line which Loutit found behind him on his retirement. Half a mile to the south, on Bolton's Ridge, where Milne had in the early morning occupied the Turkish trench above Victoria Gully, the line had also been fixed, as will presently be told. But between the two there was never, from the time of Salisbury's advance until nightfall, an established line capable either of receiving or of carrying out an order. Into this gap there was poured during the next few hours nearly the whole of the 2nd Brigade. In order to understand the manner in which this Brigade entered the struggle, it is necessary for a moment to return to the hours which followed the dawn.

It will be remembered that, when the first four transports anchored immediately before daybreak, the *Galeka*, carrying the 6th and 7th Battalions of the 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade, was brought by her commander, Captain Burt, close in to the shore. The troops were ordered to disembark in the ship's boats, and six of these moved off at once. Four boatloads—most of Jackson's company of the 7th—made to the left, and were shot to pieces at Fisherman's Hut. The fifth and sixth boats contained Colonel Elliott, the commander of the 7th, Lieutenant Grills,¹ the rest of Jackson's company, and part of another. They had rowed themselves to within 400 yards of land when a returning steam-pinnace met them and took them in tow to the part of the beach where from now onward practically all troops were landed—the cove between the greater and lesser knolls of Ari Burnu, which henceforth became known simply as the "Beach."

The plan of the landing, as has been said, was for the 2nd Brigade to go ashore immediately after the 3rd, extend the left of the covering force from Baby 700 to Hill 971,

¹ Major S. Grills; 59th Bn. Rubber expert; of Footscray, Melbourne, Vic. b. Kilkeel, Co. Down, Ireland, 21 Oct., 1888.

and protect the left flank in the foothills down to the sea at the Fisherman's Hut. The detailed orders to the brigade were based upon this plan. Since it was to be put ashore north of the 3rd Brigade, it was conveyed only in the two northernmost transports of the first four.² The *Galeka* carried the 6th and 7th Battalions, and the *Novian* the 5th and the brigade staff. The two southernmost ships contained part of the Indian Mountain Batteries and a portion of the 1st Australian Infantry Brigade, both of which were to land at about the centre of the force, as near as possible to the 400 Plateau. Similarly, the northernmost ship in the second four carried the remaining battalion of the 2nd Brigade—the 8th. The main body of the 1st Brigade came in the southern ships of the second line.

The written orders provided that, when the 2nd Brigade landed, it should be met by one of two Staff Officers—Major Glasfurd of the 1st Australian Division or Major Villiers-Stuart³ of the Corps. These two officers were to land earlier, and their first duty was to choose four convenient forming-up places near to the beach but clear of it, and two larger areas of rendezvous, one north and the other south of the landing-place. The intention was to form up the companies from each transport clear of the beach as they severally landed, in order not to hamper the work of unloading stores and guns; and then to march them to larger areas northward or southward where battalions and brigades destined for the respective flanks could assemble before entering upon their part in the operations. The 2nd Brigade was to be guided to the northern rendezvous. From that point its various battalions were to make their way along the crest of the ridges to their objective north of the 3rd Brigade. The 5th, 8th, and 6th were to climb the 400 Plateau, and thence march northward along the Second ridge to Baby 700 and Hill 971.⁴ The 7th, which was to form the extreme left flank, would ascend Plugge's and thence march northwards up the main ridge.

It had been arranged that the first part of the brigade to land should be the 5th—which had farthest to go—together

² See Map 9, p. 246

³ Major C. H. Villiers-Stuart, p.s.c. Officer of Indian Regular Army. Of Castlane, Carrick-on-Suir, Ireland, b. Edinburgh, Scotland, 2 Sept., 1874. Killed in action, 17 May, 1915

⁴ See Map 7, p. 227

with the brigade staff. But the *Novian*, which carried them, had some difficulty in getting to her berth, and when she reached it no tows or destroyers came to her. The result was that the brigadier (Colonel M'Cay) and the 5th were much later in landing than the 6th and the 7th, from the *Galeka*. Thus it came about that Colonel Elliott of the 7th was the first senior officer of the 2nd Brigade to reach the shore. He landed south of the northern knoll of the Beach. After seeing the men into the cover of the steep gullies above the Beach, he set out to look for Glasfurd or Villiers-Stuart to guide his battalion. He was told that they were not yet ashore. He then asked for Colonel MacLagan. Someone said that MacLagan had his headquarters near the top of one of the gullies leading to Plugge's. Shortly before MacLagan left that headquarters to follow the 9th and 10th across the valley, Elliott panted up the hill to him and asked where the 7th Battalion was to go.

MacLagan told him that the original plan could not be carried out, the 3rd Brigade having been landed a mile too far to the north, and ordered him to collect his battalion on the southern point of the Beach. Returning to the Beach, Elliott found that the Staff Officers who were to guide the landing troops had arrived, and that one company of his battalion, under Major Mason,⁵ had already been sent to a rendezvous chosen in Shrapnel Gully. Elliott ordered Lieutenants Grills and Swift⁶ and other officers of his battalion, as they landed, to take their men there also.


The two guides, Glasfurd and Villiers-Stuart, had landed at 5.35 a.m., a few minutes after Elliott. Glasfurd had climbed the hill straight to MacLagan's headquarters, and had heard his decision that the 2nd Brigade, instead of going to the left of the 3rd, must come in on its right. He returned to the Beach, and at 5.50 a.m. met Elliott there with a company of the 7th. Glasfurd decided that the first forming-up places should be in the gullies immediately above the Beach, for the reason that these afforded cover against the shrapnel from Gaba Tepe which burst intermittently over the landing-place.

⁵ Lieut.-Colonel C. J. C. Mason, DSO. Formerly Judge's Associate in the Supreme Court, Melbourne; commanded 59th Bn. 1917/18; 5th M.G. Bn. 1918; b Carlton, Melb., Vic., 1 May, 1878.

⁶ Major C. H. Swift; 7th Bn. Clerk; b Moonee Ponds, Melbourne, Vic., 10 Oct., 1894.

He then hurried over the knoll at the southern end of the Beach into Shrapnel Gully; and partly in the level scrub of the valley near its mouth, partly on the rear slope of the Razorback opposite, he fixed the Rendezvous. This slope was always fairly sheltered, and at a later date became the camp of the Indian Field Ambulance and the mule-lines for one of the Indian Mountain Batteries.

MacLagan for his part had decided that the whole plan of the landing must be changed. The information obtained before the landing was that the Turks had considerable forces immediately south of Gaba Tepe, and he and others expected a heavy counter-attack



from that quarter. As the 3rd Brigade had been landed a mile too far to the north, there would be no force on the right adequate to meet this counter-attack. Moreover all chance of carrying out any semblance of the plans of the day had vanished, unless reinforcements were brought in on the right. The obvious solution was that the troops of the 2nd Brigade, now landing, should come in on the south instead of the north and take over the right flank from the 3rd.

But M'Cay, commanding the 2nd Brigade, was MacLagan's senior, and he had definite orders to go to the north. MacLagan had already diverted M'Cay's leading troops when the latter, coming ashore and starting up MacLagan's Ridge to obtain a view of the country northwards, met MacLagan and Glasfurd coming down it. M'Cay knew that Elliott had landed before him, and presumed that he had gone to the north in accordance with the plans for the brigade. MacLagan told him that he had intercepted Elliott's battalion and had sent it to the right, that being the flank which was in danger of being turned.

"I want you to take your whole brigade in on my right," MacLagan said.

M'Cay pointed out that this was asking him, as his first act, to disobey orders, and suggested that he himself should go forward and see the position.

"There isn't time," MacLagan answered. "I assure you my right will be turned if you do not do this."

M'Cay asked if MacLagan could also assure him that the left, where the 2nd Brigade should have been, was secure. MacLagan gave him the assurance, and M'Cay then agreed to throw his whole brigade in on the right. MacLagan himself went forward to the 400 Plateau near Major Salisbury's position. M'Cay, with Major Cass and the staff of the 2nd Brigade, hurried southward across Shrapnel Gully to the seaward slope of the plateau. Here, near the top of the hill (which afterwards bore his name), in a leafy gutter leading onto the plateau, he placed his headquarters. Leaving Cass to establish the brigade headquarters, the brigadier went up to the summit to obtain an idea of the country and to gain touch with his battalions.

Not long after this the commander of the Division, General Bridges, came ashore. He left the *Prince of Wales* early in the morning in a trawler with Colonel White, Major Blamey, and others of his staff, and reached the Beach at 7.20. Shells from Gaba Tepe were bursting from time to time over the cove, but in the gullies leading up from it there was good shelter. In one of these Major Mackworth,[†] the signalling officer of the 1st Division, had already established the divisional signal office. Seeing Bridges and White pass along the Beach, Mackworth called out to them that he would soon have telephone lines from there to both the brigades.

When Bridges landed, both MacLagan and M'Cay had gone forward. Bridges could find no senior officer on the Beach to inform him of the position. Accordingly, suspecting that the chief source of trouble to his force would be Gaba Tepe and the Turkish reserves near it, he hurried southwards to survey the position for himself. He picked up from officers and men whom he passed the information that the plan had been changed, and that the 2nd Brigade had been diverted to the south. White, in passing, had told Mackworth where the

[†] Colonel H. L. Mackworth, C.M.G., D.S.O., R.E. Officer of British Regular Army. Commanded 1st Div. Sig. Coy., 1914/16; b. 17 March, 1878.

General was going, and some messages were sent after him, from which Bridges gathered further enlightenment as to the position.

Taking White with him, and keeping close to the high bank of the Beach in order to avoid the shells from Gaba Tepe which from time to time burst over the cove, Bridges climbed across the neck of Little Ari Burnu ("Queensland Point") into Shrapnel Gully. Wounded from the Second ridge were already streaming past on their way to the Beach. Some odd portions of the 2nd Brigade were in the valley, and a heavy fire of rifles and machine-guns was still playing from Baby 700 upon the flat near its mouth. The first sight which met Bridges' eyes was a number of these troops, under fire without any protection, sheltering in some disorder behind a high bank in the creek which ran down the gully. This disorganisation was of small importance; possibly it was due to absence of officers or to lack of control on the part of some junior. But Bridges had no sympathy for any weakness. He made with his long strides straight to the place, and spoke fiercely to the men. For God's sake let them remember that they were Australians. They looked up rather shamefacedly at the tall cold man standing amongst the bullets, and then came out and re-formed in the open. He left them, and went southwards across the valley and up M'Cay's Hill.

It so happened that both Bridges and M'Cay, upon landing, made directly to the same point on the battlefield. M'Cay, after leaving his headquarters on the seaward slope of M'Cay's Hill, had climbed to its summit; and from that standpoint, looking across Victoria Gully at Bolton's Ridge (as Milne had done in the early morning), he recognised at once the importance of this high shoulder on the extreme right of the Australian line. The skyline of the hill was only sparsely defended, the troops who had arrived there earlier having mostly left it to push on inland. On returning to his headquarters, he ordered Cass, his brigade-major, to collect what men he could at the foot of the gullies below M'Cay's Hill and lead them up to Bolton's Ridge to hold it. As the 8th Battalion was at that moment arriving—being the last of the 2nd Brigade to land—he ordered its commander, Colonel Bolton, to dig in on this ridge, which later bore his name.

Bridges, striding up M'Cay's Hill with White, missed M'Cay, and could not find his headquarters. But looking out from the hilltop where M'Cay had stood, he saw Bolton's Ridge lined with men, probably of the 8th Battalion, who were at the moment stationary. There was little sound of fighting at this time upon the right of the line. It seemed to White that the precious hour in which an advance might still be made was being allowed to slip.

But though there seemed nothing to prevent an advance on the right, Bridges doubted whether all was going well with the left. He remembered the rifle and machine-gun fire sweeping straight down Shrapnel Gully from behind the left flank. Though he too felt inclined to order the men on Bolton's to advance, he realised that he did not yet know the whole situation, and that it would be rash to take such a step until he learned more about the left. He therefore ordered the line on Bolton's to hold fast until further orders. He himself went northwards towards Johnston's Jolly, intending to reconnoitre the left of the line by walking along the Second ridge. As, however, it was impossible to stalk over the heads of the whole firing line he was constrained to return to the Beach by the way he had come. Climbing thence to the top of Ari Burnu Knoll, where the bullets were whipping into the old blockhouse parapet beside him, he saw that the Turks were at any rate not behind the Australians on the northern foothills; and after trying to climb Plugge's, which was too steep to be surmounted in the time which he could spare, he went back to Mackworth's signal station on the Beach. Telephone lines were now working from that station both to MacLagan and M'Cay, and Bridges approved of the gully for his headquarters. The general staff, quartermaster-general's, and other offices of the divisional staff quickly settled there on ledges and shelves dug into the bank.

In the meantime, from an hour long before that at which Bridges or even M'Cay landed, the 2nd Brigade had been coming ashore from its transports under a galling fire of shrapnel from the battery at Gaba Tepe. The boats of the 6th from the *Galeka*, following those of the 7th, found the shells of this battery bursting overhead during the last 200 yards to the shore. The soldiers were rowing; the officers were in bows

or stern. "Now then—all together!" shouted Lieutenant Prisk^a to his boat-load, as if coaching an awkward crew for a boat-race. The oars dipped three or four times in fair rhythm. Then—crack overhead—a scatter of shrapnel; sometimes a man hit; and the coaching had to begin over again. Nearing the beach, one boat was hit on the nose and began to sink. Two naval steamboats came alongside; some of the men were by then in the water, but they did not throw off their equipment.

Under such difficulties the 6th Battalion landed immediately after the 7th, and, boat-load by boat-load, as directed by Glasfurd, it moved over into the Rendezvous in Shrapnel Gully. Machine-gun and rifle fire was still coming down the gully from some position far away at its head on Baby 700. Before 7 a.m. half of the 6th Battalion had arrived, under Colonel McNicoll,⁹ in the open scrub on the foot of the Razorback, about 200 yards from the 7th. The 5th Battalion began presently to form behind the 6th; the 8th followed and assembled beside the 5th.

It must not be imagined that the battalions of the 2nd Brigade were drawn up at the Rendezvous like a compact force on the parade-ground, nor that it was possible to issue any clear order explaining the complete cancellation of its plans and defining its new objectives. Indeed the objectives had been only vaguely determined. Neither M'Cay nor MacLagan had been in conference with Bridges; and in their own hurried conference on the hillside all that they could decide was that the 2nd Brigade was to be diverted to the right of the 3rd. M'Cay's understanding of the agreement was that his brigade should prolong the line of the 3rd and conform to its movements. Presumably it would take up the rôle which the 3rd Brigade was to have played in that part of the battlefield. Whether or not it was to attack the Third ridge, does not appear to have been decided.

The commands for the 2nd Brigade necessarily came from each of the three leaders, who had had so little opportunity of coming to a precise agreement. The fact that all previous

^a Colonel R. C. G. Prisk, 6th Bn. Duntroon Graduate, of Adelaide, S. Aust.; b Mount Barker, S. Aust., 6 Aug., 1894.

⁹ Brig.-General Sir W. R. McNicoll, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D. Commanded 10th Inf. Bde. 1916/18. School teacher, of Geelong and Melbourne. Vic., b South Melbourne, Vic., 27 May, 1877.

orders had been cancelled was learned by most officers of the brigade as soon as they landed. Such fresh orders as reached them were in the form of short verbal commands given by a bewildering variety of authorities to company after company as it came ashore. The telephone lines, the planned routes and well-marked tracks, which form part of the normal system for the co-ordination of attacks, could not be at once established in such a landing; each company—at certain periods each boat-load—which reached the shore was urgently needed in the firing line, and commands came to them from any senior officer in touch with the situation.

The result was that, by the time the last company of any battalion had reached the Rendezvous on the sheltered slope of the Razorback, its leading company had been ordered on to reinforce a "firing line" which was vaguely understood to exist ahead; and, by the time the head of that battalion moved forward, the companies at its tail would find themselves blocking the head of the next battalion, which was working up the hill in consequence of a similar command. The pressure of companies in rear was forcing ahead other companies still waiting for instructions on the hillside. Senior officers of the companies behind sent urgent inquiries as to the cause of the delay, and sharp orders to move onward. In some cases whole companies found themselves pushed forward in this manner without any instructions whatever, and guided only by the impression, picked up from orders given to others, that they were to reinforce the firing line of the 3rd Brigade.

Such was the position of the 2nd Brigade which now began to be poured into the gap on the 400 Plateau. It is probable that both MacLagan and M'Cay imagined that the brigade was reinforcing a more or less definite line which they assumed to exist on the plateau, although M'Cay became aware of a further gap which presently opened immediately to the south of it. But the line on the 400 Plateau was completely fluid. Company after company, battalion after battalion, of the 2nd Brigade moved into the fight, mostly with no definite order except to reinforce the 3rd, but with a vague idea that they were to help the covering force to advance as far as it could.

The word to advance having once been given, officers and men, both of the 3rd and 2nd Brigades, had it firmly in their minds that they were intended to reach the Third ridge, or at any rate the fore slope of the Lone Pine Plateau. The advance was useless; without a concerted advance of the line further north, the Third Ridge could never be captured. But the men and officers who received the order did not realise that there was no forward movement north of them; nor was it a matter which concerned them if they had been aware of it. So far as any of them knew, their instructions were those which had been preached at them for weeks—to push forward somehow, no matter what happened to others. Whether their objective was the Third ridge or merely the forward slope of the 400 Plateau, they knew not. Their duty, as they conceived it, was to press forward as far as they could towards these positions, and, whatever position they reached, to hold it at all costs.

It followed that, instead of an organised line being formed along the crest of the 400 Plateau, this upland became the scene of the most costly struggle of the day—a struggle which, beginning with the advance of the two companies under Salisbury, involved within a few hours nearly half of the 1st Australian Division. Probably neither MacLagan nor M'Cay, the two brigadiers responsible for this part of the line, had any conception of the heroic but useless advances which swept at least five times over the plateau during the next few hours, or of the even more costly retirements. The story of this struggle will never be fully known; too many of those who took part in it lay before nightfall killed and missing out in the scrub of the plateau and among the gullies and spurs to the south of it. In this fighting there was lost half the flower of the 1st Australian Division. So far as it has been gathered, the story is as follows.

The 2nd Brigade had begun to reinforce the 3rd upon the plateau before MacLagan's second order to Salisbury was given. The first order was to dig in on the 400 Plateau; the second sent Salisbury forward to meet an imminent counter-attack; the third was, in effect, that the advanced parties should be withdrawn and the line again established on the 400 Plateau. But the third order largely failed because

there was now no organised line to carry it out. Even before Elliott reached his battalion with MacLagan's earliest orders to him—and long before M'Cay had arrived in Shrapnel Gully with the change of plans in his mind—the first companies of the 7th Battalion had been already sent on into the fight. In Elliott's absence Major Blezard,¹⁰ one of the company commanders, was in charge of the battalion when Glasfurd sent its first troops onto the Rendezvous. He had no sooner arrived there, a little after 6 a.m., than he was instructed by some officer to send his own company and part of Henderson's¹¹ onto the 400 Plateau. This part of the battalion had, therefore, gone ahead and only Mason's company and the rest of Henderson's were at the Rendezvous when Elliott rejoined them.

Elliott's impression was that, although MacLagan had ordered him to collect his battalion towards the southern end of the position, the rest of the original plan was still in operation. Under that plan the 5th Battalion was to head the brigade in its advance from the 400 Plateau to Hill 971, and some instruction had reached Elliott that, as the 5th Battalion was late, the 7th was to take its place. Elliott accordingly directed the rest of the 7th to move up onto the 400 Plateau in order to begin the advance upon Hill 971, with Mason's company leading. Including the part of the battalion already sent up the hill, only three companies of the 7th could be found. Jackson's company had disappeared. Elliott searched everywhere, at his wits' end to find it. Most of it was at that moment lying on the naked beach before Fisherman's Hut, or huddled in its boats there, dead or dying. In vain Elliott hunted through the slopes of Shrapnel Gully. He heard that one of his machine-guns—the other had been dropped, its tall bearer shot dead, in deep water beside the boats—was on MacLaurin's Hill, and he proceeded thither to find Jackson. He could discover no trace of him. He then stood at the lower end of the Rendezvous, where the other battalions of the 2nd Brigade were arriving, and acted (to use his own description) as a sort of

¹⁰ Colonel I. Blezard, V.D. 7th Bn. Of Moama, N.S.W., and Echuca, Vic., b. Padiham, Lancs., Eng., 17 Feb., 1878.

¹¹ Captain R. H. Henderson, 7th Bn. Estate agent, of Hawthorn, Melbourne, Vic., b. Hawthorn, 10 Dec., 1892. Killed in action, 8 May, 1915.

directing post for them while he anxiously scanned each new detachment for traces of his own missing company.

While he waited at the bottom of White's Valley, only a few stray men rewarding his tenacious efforts to find them, Elliott presently saw the last of the companies which he had sent onto the plateau moving over the skyline at the head of White's Valley. Major Blezard, the commander of this company, had about this moment been hit above the heart by a bullet, but the figure of Captain Hunter,¹² its second-in-command, was clearly recognisable on the hilltop. Elliott was about to hurry up the hill to join his battalion, when he was met by Colonel M'Cay, who told him for the first time of the sweeping change in the plans. There was a gap, M'Cay said, in the line which was being formed by the 9th and 10th Battalions on the Second ridge. This was before the 9th, under Salisbury, had been sent forward; the gap in question was between the 9th and 10th, and was exactly in front of Elliott. M'Cay ordered the 7th to fill it, and Elliott put in his three companies. He was still grievously troubled about the absence of Jackson, and was endeavouring to collect odd men of the 7th in the gullies behind the line, when a message reached him from Captain Henderson, who commanded one of the companies which he had put into the line: "Have been ordered to advance 300 yards beyond the position you have assigned to me."

Elliott climbed onto the plateau to see the situation for himself. As he topped M'Cay's Hill, a bullet hit him in the ankle and put him out of the fight. But Henderson's message marked that critical development to which reference has already been made—the change which came over the battle when Salisbury's line on the 400 Plateau was ordered to advance.

It is possible that Salisbury's line had gone forward to meet the Turkish counter-attack, which was approaching from the Third ridge, before the 7th had actually reached the line. But the order to Salisbury's companies, once given, spread to the troops on either flank of them and, almost certainly, to those who arrived in support. It was then

¹² Captain H. H. Hunter; 7th Bn Dentist; b. Bendigo, Vic., 18 Nov., 1881. Killed in action, 8 May, 1915.

a part of the British Army training that, as orders were difficult to communicate in a modern battle, the men and officers in the firing line must always be ready to act upon words of command shouted along the line, repeated from man to man by word of mouth. Unreliable as that practice was, it had been drilled into the troops at Mena, and was part of their constant exercises. The result was that the order to the 9th Battalion to advance came to be repeated to part of the 10th Battalion on their flank and to some of the fragments of Hilmer Smith's company of the 12th sandwiched in between. It appears to have been passed to the newly-arrived 7th Battalion, and, although Henderson at once questioned it in his message to Elliott, part at least of the 7th acted upon it. Whitham's company of the 12th, which had come up with Milne and had been digging on Salisbury's right, moved, as soon as the 2nd Brigade appeared behind it, southward to Bolton's Ridge. When troops of the 2nd Brigade began to arrive behind him there, Whitham made a further advance towards the Third ridge. Whitham was carrying out, as far as he knew it, the original plan of the attack, but his advance was part of the general movement which took place at this moment on the 400 Plateau.

When Salisbury ordered his N.C.O.'s to get the men into their equipment and hurry on by sections as soon as they were ready, the platoon under Fortescue, which he had stationed ahead of him, was still in its place, overlooking the edge of Owen's Gully. Major Brand was at that moment returning to the line, leaving the advanced parties under Boase and Thomas on the forward slope of Lone Pine as outposts to cover the digging in. While Brand was still on his way, a message reached him from MacLagan telling him of the decision that the line was to dig in on the Second ridge, and ordering the withdrawal of all advanced parties onto the main line. But the moment had passed when the second part of this order could be carried out. The advanced parties had already been instructed to fall back if heavily attacked, and the summit of the 400 Plateau was now swept by a fire so fierce that both the sending of an order and its performance were wellnigh impossible. MacLagan's order for withdrawal, if sent, failed to reach the advanced parties.


Salisbury waited till the last of his men had hurriedly fitted on their equipment, and then pushed forward with them. The sections had disappeared into the scrub on the Lone Pine (or southern) lobe of the 400 Plateau. Presently he overtook about fifty men of various companies of the 9th advancing through the scrub. With them were Captain Milne, already several times wounded, and Lieutenant Young¹³. About this time Salisbury himself was hit in the hand. The direction of their advance carried them south of Owen's Gully towards The Cup, where were the captured Turkish guns.

The fire which now swept over the Lone Pine plateau was in strange contrast to the lull during which the line had been digging in. The Turkish counter-measures to the landing were by this time beginning to be felt. The enemy, who had appeared on the Third ridge in the early morning, was now driving in Loutit and Ryder and advancing in strength from Scrubby Knoll across the ridges north-east of the 400 Plateau. As these Turks now saw section after section of Salisbury's companies advancing through the scrub on the summit, many hundreds of their rifles and several machine-guns were turned upon the plateau. This fire came from the Third ridge directly in front of Salisbury, and from the ridges and spurs ahead of either flank. But it was seldom that so much as a single Turkish infantryman could be seen from the plateau; the enemy simply lay in the scrub on all the crests and fired through it.

Of the fifty men with Milne and Salisbury only ten reached the further side of The Cup. Some of them, in passing the guns, stayed to fire from behind the steel gun-shields; others dropped into the shelter of the crevices; others were killed. The density of the scrub and the whirlwind of fire which swept through it had torn to shreds any organisation which such an advance by sections permitted. The story of the advance over the plateau becomes a narrative of isolated parties, seldom in touch with each other, striving in the loyalty of their nature to carry out such vague instructions as they had received. It is impossible to follow in these pages the advance and retirement of each small group

¹³ Major W. McK. Young, D.S.O.; 6th Bn. Of Koongal, Rockhampton, Q'land, b. Maryborough, Q'land, 30 Jan., 1886.

Map No. 17



THE POSITION ON THE 400 PLATEAU DURING THE RETIREMENT OF THE ADVANCED PARTIES OF 3RD BRIGADE, AND THE ADVANCE OF 2ND BRIGADE, BETWEEN 10 A.M. AND NOON, 25TH APRIL, 1915

British troops, etc., red; Turkish, blue. Height contours, 10 metres.

across the 400 Plateau on that day. The movements here related are only typical of those of many a brave handful whose story too often died with them upon that dreadful summit.

Before Salisbury advanced, Sergeant Connell¹⁴ of the 12th Battalion commanded a section which had been sandwiched into the line of the 10th, and of which he had been placed in charge during the orderly reorganisation upon the plateau. The order was passed from Major Hurcombe¹⁵ of the 10th that this part of the line was to advance in small parties, about twenty at a time. Connell took this for a command to advance against the Third ridge. As he led his party across Johnston's Jolly, Turks jumped up from the scrub ahead of them and bolted. They had probably been lying there all the morning, and a few seem to have lain there still, occasionally sniping when a good target offered. Connell led his party half-southwards into Owen's Gully, but other sections of Australians could be seen who continued to advance eastwards on the summit of Johnston's Jolly. Ahead of these, where the shoulder of the Jolly sloped into Owen's Gully, Connell noticed a short trench containing a party of Turks and a machine-gun. The enemy were intent upon the Australians on the Jolly, who had seen them and were making towards them. Connell's party at once turned up the slope and raced for the gun. As they neared it the Turks caught sight of them, fired a few hurried shots, shouldered the gun, and disappeared into the scrub.

Connell intended to occupy this trench with his party. But no sooner had he reached it, than a Turkish battery opened upon him with shrapnel. He therefore took his men down into Owen's Gully, and, after wandering in the thick scrub towards its mouth, moved into a deserted Turkish trench which led up onto Lone Pine, near the inland end of the 400 Plateau. There for a time his party stayed.

A platoon under Lieutenant Grills of the 7th Battalion found its way to what was perhaps another portion of the

¹⁴ Captain W. A. Connell, D.C.M.; 12th Bn. Miner; b Launceston, Tas., 22 Aug., 1884. Died of wounds, 28 Dec., 1917.

¹⁵ Colonel F. W. Hurcombe, V.D. Commanded 50th Bn 1916 Shipping agent and area officer, of St. Peter's, Adelaide, S. Aust.; b Hindmarsh, Adelaide, 16 Aug., 1867.

same trench. Grills commanded a platoon of Henderson's company, but the order to dig in had never reached him. He only knew that his duty was to advance. An enemy battery was showering the summit of the plateau with shrapnel, and it took an hour for the party to reach this Turkish trench at the eastern end of the Pine.

At this time the forward parties under Lieutenants Boase and Thomas, whom Brand had ordered to cover the digging of Salisbury's line, were still in advance of most of the troops on the plateau. On receiving Brand's order, they had moved their platoons in touch with one another until they reached the inland end of Lone Pine. Thence they continued to advance down two of the knuckles in which the Lone Pine plateau ended. Opposite them, across Legge Valley, was the Third ridge. There were already a certain number of Turks digging at that place, and presently the head of the Turkish reinforcements from the southern end of the ridge began to pass along the skyline opposite—first a line of pack mules, then a battalion of men. These moved steadily northward along the summit of the Third ridge. The Australians sniped at them, but the range was long, and it was impossible to see the flick of the bullets in the scrub. Messages were sent back through Owen's Gully informing the main body of this movement.

For some time Boase and Thomas were able to watch the movement of the Turks with impunity. They themselves were on either side of one of the steep quarry-shaped landslides which score the eastern slope of the Lone Pine lobe. A tall arbutus scrub twelve feet high helped to screen them from the enemy's view. And though, as the numbers of the Turks on the opposite ridges increased, a fierce rifle fire and machine-gun fire began to play upon the 400 Plateau, it passed for the most part over the heads of the advanced parties. Though the bullets from four or five machine-guns were clipping the arbutus leaves over their heads, the interference with Boase's men was not serious.

The party under Thomas, however, advancing nearly to the foot of the spur, came under very heavy fire and suffered severely. Shortly afterwards the Turkish reinforcements, which till then had been making northward across the front, deployed and began to move in extended order down from the

Third ridge towards the 400 Plateau. This was almost certainly the same movement of which the first stages so impressed Dougall, and to meet which Salisbury had been ordered forward. Thomas consulted hurriedly with Boase. The party under Loutit and Ryder, which had been out on the Third ridge, had been driven in across the left front, and both the flanks of Thomas and Boase were now in the air. The Turkish advance threatened to pass them by on the north and cut them off. They therefore decided to withdraw alternately by stages of about fifty yards, each party covering the retirement of the other by its fire.


Corporal Harrison—who had led the attack on the Turkish guns—was on the extreme right of Thomas's platoon, commanding an isolated section of men on the south-eastern corner of Lone Pine. The Turkish attack on the north of the Pine, which drove in Thomas, was hidden from Harrison's party. They had heard nothing of the withdrawal, and stayed out, overlooking the southern reach of Legge Valley, where the enemy were at present inactive. Meanwhile the rest of the advanced party, under Boase and Thomas, retired onto the summit of Lone Pine, until they reached a position about fifty yards in front of the Turkish guns at The Cup. There they formed a disjointed line in the scrub. Thomas had sent one of his men, Lance-Corporal Harman,¹⁶ with a message to Major Brand, reporting the Turkish attack and the dangerous isolation of the advanced party, and asking for support. Harman was hit, but the message appears to have got through either to Brand or to MacLagan.

It was to meet this Turkish advance that Salisbury's line moved forward. Portions of it began shortly to arrive at the roughly-constituted line which Boase and Thomas were holding. Lieutenant Haymen¹⁷ of the 9th, with about fifty men, having been ordered by Brand to reinforce the advanced party, reached Thomas about half an hour after the retirement to The Cup. Haymen's party was put into the gaps in the line. At this stage the Turkish rifle and machine-gun

¹⁶ L/Cpl H. R. Harman (No 669, 9th Bn) Motor mechanic; of Lismore, N S W.; b Windsor, Berks., Eng., 17 Dec., 1884. Died of wounds, 2 May, 1915.

¹⁷ Lieut. F. G. Haymen; 9th Bn Surveyor and undergraduate; of Brisbane, Q'land; b. Toowoomba, Q'land, 14th Sept., 1891. Killed in action, 25 Apr., 1915.

fire, sweeping the summit of the plateau, was causing great losses. First Milne, and shortly afterwards Salisbury reached the same rough line in the scrub. But no organisation or even communication along the line was possible. Somewhat detached from the rest, on the right of this position—where the summit of Lone Pine gave a wide view over the spurs southwards towards Gaba Tepe as well as northward to the main



range—were the two machine-guns of the 9th Battalion. The machine-gun officer of the battalion, Lieutenant Costin,¹⁸ had been one of the leaders in the advance from the beach. So difficult was communication in this scrub under the fire which swept through it, that Costin knew nothing of the whereabouts of the rest of the 9th or of the existence of any firing line.

It was about 10 a.m. when Salisbury and Milne reached their position beyond the summit of the plateau, and from that hour until late in the afternoon it still contained remnants of the 9th and 10th Battalions. Haymen and about fifteen men stayed on in the Turkish trenches near the captured Krupp guns. Fortescue, who in the early morning had been stationed by Salisbury as an outpost to cover his original line, found his way to the same place. Finding that the fire from an invisible machine-gun further down Owen's Gully was killing his men, Fortescue had crossed the gully southward to avoid it. As he lay on its southern edge, a party of Australians came up. They were men of the 2nd Brigade under a captain of the 8th Battalion. Their orders were to reinforce the firing line, and the officer sharply asked Fortescue what he was doing there. Fortescue's explanation—that he had been told to remain there while Salisbury dug in—did not satisfy him. The officer had seen no line of any

¹⁸ Lieut. J. W. Costin; 9th Bn. Telegraphic engineer, of Brisbane, Q'land; b. Graceville, Brisbane, 1 Sept., 1891. Killed in action, 25 Apr., 1915.

sort. He told Fortescue to get on with his men into the firing line, towards which he believed his own advance was directed.

The 2nd Brigade was by this time moving in small bodies across the plateau, and Fortescue went forward with his party. The fire sweeping the plateau grew fiercer. Machine-guns invisible to them raked it with their bullets. Aimed rifle shots picked off one after another of the men, and their numbers dwindled. Presently they saw Australians ahead of them.

They were Lieutenant Costin with his machine-guns. Costin was there with only the men of his section; he knew nothing of the rest of the 9th Battalion; but he believed that Lieutenant Haymen with a few men was in some gun position down the hill. Fortescue, who had only seven men left with him, moved in the direction indicated by Costin, and found Haymen with fifteen men in the gun position, somewhat screened from fire by the shoulder of The Cup. Fortescue asked Haymen if the firing line was ahead of him. Haymen replied that he was sure that no men of their own side were now in advance of them, for rifle fire was reaching him from the front at short range.

The Turkish counter-attack was by this time driving past the north of the 400 Plateau. These Turks were ignoring the southern flank of the Australian position, and were bringing their reinforcements northwards by some road which led along the summit of the Third ridge across the Australian front. Opposite the 400 Plateau they turned and moved to the attack in conjunction with other large reinforcements, which were arriving from an easterly direction at Scrubby Knoll. Some of the Turks, with machine-guns, had followed Loutit's party to the foothills north-east of the 400 Plateau, and had reached Johnston's Jolly. At the time of Salisbury's advance they were driven from the Jolly, but they were now thrusting again with ever-increasing numbers behind them. Their gun teams, advancing up the Third ridge, were seen by Connell, Thomas, and others, and, being fired upon, were forced to limber up quickly and change their position. But at least one battery of mountain-guns was presently established near Scrubby Knoll, and between 11 o'clock and noon they opened a most deadly fire upon the 400 Plateau

About midday clouds of dust continually rising by Scrubby Knoll betrayed the arrival of constant reinforcements of Turkish infantry.

This attack was driving in between the Australian force on Baby 700 and that on the 400 Plateau. Far up the main range Tulloch on Battleship Hill, and shortly afterwards Jacobs and the parties supporting Kindon on the inland spurs of Baby 700, felt these bodies penetrating past their right, just as those forward on the plateau felt them pushing past their left. The Turks were pressing onto Johnston's Jolly, and into the bottom of Owen's Gully. Salisbury could hear the fire of the Turkish rifles in that quarter growing closer and closer. It seemed to him that it was being directed against the Australians further back on the plateau, and there appeared to be great danger of the Turks driving through onto its summit behind him. They were seen, however, by a party of the 12th Battalion somewhat in rear on the northern side of the gully. This was possibly Connell's party, who had been driven by shrapnel fire from their forward position in a Turkish trench on the plateau and had retired up the gully to a niche on the slope of Johnston's Jolly. From that point during the remainder of the day they were firing at the Turks who attempted to steal across the foot of Owen's Gully into their old trenches on Lone Pine. This fire appeared to check the enemy, for the sound of their rifles grew less.

Salisbury had sent back for reinforcements; but his messengers never returned and no reinforcements came. He conferred with Milne, and they decided to take the men back in widely extended order to the summit of Lone Pine, some 300 yards in rear, where there seemed to be some sort of main line. This movement was carried out. Salisbury, skirting Owen's Gully, retired behind the crest. Milne, who had been wounded five times, was sent to the rear. The troops with whom Salisbury now met almost all belonged to the 2nd Brigade. At Brown's Dip he found twenty of them without an officer, and took them forward over the crest, till he reached again some part of the rough line near Costin's machine-guns—a few hundred yards to the right rear of his old position. A fair number of his own men were here, and here during the greater part of the day Salisbury remained.

The fire upon the crest of Lone Pine was now almost beyond endurance. In addition to the Turkish rifles and machine-guns, the mountain-guns on Scrubby Knoll were throwing their salvoes rapidly and without cessation onto the summit. One after another, Salisbury's officers fell. Captain Melbourne¹⁹ was badly wounded in the head; Lieutenant Chambers was hit; some distance from them Lieutenant Costin, bravely holding his isolated position on the crest, was killed by a shell which destroyed one of his machine-guns. Steele,²⁰ the machine-gun sergeant of the 9th, who survived him, carried the remaining gun down the hill to Haymen's party in the gun-pits. The dead and wounded in Salisbury's line lay in some places two deep in the scrub. Salisbury returned two or three times for reinforcements to Brown's Dip behind the crest, where Captain Black,²¹ medical officer of the 6th Battalion, had his aid-post. Every time Salisbury took forward men of the 2nd Brigade. The continuous and heavy loss which the line was suffering in advance of the crest convinced him that the wisest course would be to withdraw it into the shelter of the reverse slope. But the doctrine of the day was that a line should be in advance of the crest, and Colonel McNicoll of the 6th Battalion, whom Salisbury met near Brown's Dip, was anxious to get his men forward. Salisbury led several parties. His own men had mostly fallen, and his line, such as it was, became gradually held by the 2nd Brigade. The party with Lieutenant Thomas, fifty yards in advance of the gun-pits, eventually consisted entirely of men of that Brigade.

The troops who first reinforced Salisbury, and who for some hours of the day formed a line across part of the gap upon the 400 Plateau, were a portion of the 7th Battalion (which had been placed on the plateau by Elliott), together with two companies of the 6th which followed them. Early in the morning, while the 6th Battalion had been crossing Shrapnel Gully towards the Rendezvous, Colonel MacLagan passed

¹⁹ Captain A. C. V. Melbourne; 9th Bn University lecturer; b. Adelaide, S. Aust., 10 June, 1888.

²⁰ Major A. Steele, D.S.O., D.C.M.; 11th Bn. Commanded 3rd M.G. Coy. 1916/17. Drill instructor in Aust Permanent Forces; b. Mount Gambier, S. Aust., 20 Aug., 1888. Killed in action, 7 Oct., 1917.

²¹ Colonel J. J. Black, D.S.O., V.D. Commanded 7th Field Amb. 1916/17; b. Melbourne, Vic., 23 Aug., 1887.

it, and asked Colonel McNicoll, its commander, to extend the right flank of the 3rd Brigade. McNicoll had only eight or nine boatloads of his troops with him. Sending two officers to the Beach to guide the rest of the battalion, he hurried to the right, taking with him Major H. G. Bennett,²² the young officer who was second-in-command of the 6th, and the two leading companies. The struggle in which these two companies engaged on the spurs south of the Lone Pine plateau will be described in the next chapter. The two rear companies, landing after them, were diverted while on their way forward, and became involved in the fighting on the southern part of the 400 Plateau. A portion of them, under Major Wells, formed a line in rear of the crest of Lone Pine. In extension of this position Major Bennett organised a line among the spurs south of it. For a time, about midday, the line established under these two officers formed an important rallying-ground across part of the gap upon the plateau.

The 6th Battalion was followed by the 5th. The *Novian* was late in discharging her troops, and the first boatloads of the 5th were forming up under the bank along the beach, when the tall form of General Bridges was seen running down the hill above. He was returning, flushed with haste, from his reconnaissance of the right. He caught sight of Colonel Wanliss of the 5th and, waving his cane, called to him: "Wanliss, I want you to get your men together and reinforce the firing line with all available tools and ammunition. Don't wait for the rest of your battalion to get into formation—but push on."

The two leading companies, under Major E. F. D. Fethers²³ and Captain R. P. Flockart,²⁴ were already forming up, but of the next company, Major R. Saker's,²⁵ only one platoon, under Lieutenant A. P. Derham,²⁶ had arrived. Colonel

²² Major-General H. Gordon Bennett, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D. Commanded 3rd Aust. Inf. Bde., 1917/18; 1st Aust. Div. (temp.) 1919. Area Officer, of Canterbury, Melbourne, Vic.; prior to the war was an actuarial clerk in the A.M.P. Society, Melbourne; b. Balwyn, Melbourne, 16 Apr., 1887.

²³ Major E. F. D. Fethers; 5th Bn. Bank accountant; b. Malvern, Melbourne, Vic., 11 May, 1887. Killed in action, 25 Apr., 1915.

²⁴ Major R. P. Flockart; 5th Bn. Of Camberwell, Melbourne, Vic.; b. Ballarat, Vic., 14 Nov., 1886. Died of wounds, 15 July, 1915.

²⁵ Major R. Saker; 5th Bn. b. Liverpool, Eng., 8 Nov., 1877. Killed in action, 26 Apr., 1915.

²⁶ Colonel A. P. Derham, M.C. Staff captain 2nd Inf. Bde 1915/16. Returned to Australia, completed medical course at Melbourne University and appointed to the A.A.M.C. A.D.M.S. 8th Div. A.I.F., 1940. Of Hawthorn, Vic., b. Camberwell, Vic., 12 Sept., 1891.

Wanliss ordered Derham to join Fethers' company, and the two companies, with this platoon added, "formed fours" and set out for the Rendezvous. The movements which followed were so typical of the fighting of the 2nd Brigade upon the 400 Plateau that they will be given in some detail.

The companies of the 5th Battalion toiled independently up the narrow goat-tracks in the scrub of the Razorback. The day was warm, the sky blue. Some of the men were inclined to growl at the weight of the extra tools added to the burden of their heavy packs and ammunition. High up the hill Fethers halted his company in the scrub, and sent forward scouts to find, if possible, the firing line or the route to it; others were sent to obtain instructions from the colonel, who appeared to have taken a different track to the front. The companies, resting on the slope in glorious weather, with the blue sea below them, the mountains of Imbros and Samothrace floating like clouds on the horizon, and the great fleet of transports and warships spread out a few miles from the shore, had long since forgotten their anxiety. Far overhead the rifle and machine-gun bullets, as they passed harmlessly out to sea, sang softly like homing bees. Not one in ten among the men had previously heard the sound of a bullet in the air, but the gentle lisp which they made at that distance carried no terror. Occasionally came the shrill whine of a ricochet. Every now and then a fleecy puff of shrapnel unfolded over the Beach. The unexpected ease of their conditions put the men in high spirits.

But some of the officers realised with a shock that, except for the vague directions which they had heard Bridges give to Colonel Wanliss, they had no instructions at all. The colonel had taken a different track towards the sound of the firing, and the battalion had missed him. The scouts had not returned from the front with news of the battle-line, and already the other companies were arriving at the foot of the hill. Word reached Lieutenant Derham from Saker that the rest of his company had come up, and that it would follow Derham's platoon. Saker ordered him to move ahead in the same general direction as the companies under Fethers and Flockart.

The three leading companies of the 5th pressed on again up the Razorback in three long columns—still in fours.


Presently Fethers' company moved over the skyline above the head of White's Valley and disappeared in the scrub to the left front. Derham, at the head of Saker's company, found that the bullets, previously so harmless, were now whipping in between the men. Having no orders or clear conception as to where he was to go, he slowed down the company and sent forward two scouts. Several times word came from the rear that he was to push on. The crest was now close at hand. Derham was little more than a boy, a student who had started his medical course at Melbourne University. He knew that it was against all the rules of tactics and prudence to move over the skyline ahead of his own scouts, with his company still in dense formation, under a growing machine-gun fire at short range. But he had no authority to act otherwise. He therefore led his company on again, and then, on his own responsibility, halted it immediately behind the crest. All his training cried out to him that the column should be deployed before it reached the skyline. He sent a N.C.O. back to Major Saker to explain the position, while he himself proceeded to the crest to reconnoitre the battle which they were about to enter.

From the crest he saw—nothing; empty hills, gullies bare of any sign of life, not a man nor a gun of either his own side or the enemy's. He was looking straight down the head of Owen's Gully. There was no rifle smoke, no trench, no sign of a Turk; only an occasional burst of shrapnel on either flank and the whistle of bullets through the air. Derham returned to Major Saker, who by this time had brought the company close up to the crest. At that moment the sound of rifle fire broke out on the left front, where Flockart's company had last been seen.

A message appears to have come to Saker from Flockart asking for support. Saker gave the signal to advance, and the company moved over the crest, still in column of fours. As it did so, Saker rushed out ahead of it and gave the signal to extend. The men strung out into a long line in the scrub, Derham on the left opposite the head of Owen's Gully, Saker on the right, and began to advance to Lone Pine.

Then the storm burst. The Turkish battery at Scrubby Knoll had the advancing troops in full view on the skyline at less than a mile's range. The Turkish gunners pumped

into them shell after shell. Unseen machine-guns from down Owen's Gully opened upon them, firing through the scrub. Fortunately the shrapnel was poor stuff and the machine-guns fired high. The signal was given to lie down and then to advance by short rushes. The company advanced over an abandoned Turkish trench, past the small open square of the Daisy Patch blooming with red poppies, into the thick scrub of Lone



Pine, where a man five yards away was invisible. By the time it reached the forward edge of the Daisy Patch there were with the officers only a few of their N.C.O.'s and men. They lay down there in the scrub.

As there were no orders and no firing line, Derham set to work to find the enemy who was firing at him. He searched the landscape with his glasses, but found no sign of a Turk, until, on the skyline south of Scrubby Knoll he saw the enemy's guns. Three hundred yards nearer, on the slope below the guns, was Turkish infantry, advancing by rushes through the scrub in rough skirmishing formation. Derham's men fired on them, and the Turks began to run. But, one after another, Derham's men were being hit. They were of little service to their side, lying there out of touch with any other section. Derham therefore passed a message to Saker asking if there were any further orders. The answer came back—"No." Saker was still waiting for a signal from Fethers or Flockart. Presently word reached Derham that Saker was wounded.

Derham and Saker had until then kept touch with each other by raising their heads above the scrub from time to time until they caught each other's eye, and then in concert giving the signal to advance. But now, when Derham called, no answer came; Saker had fainted from his wound. Derham started towards him to get his orders, making the journey by short

rushes. Every time he rose, a Turkish machine-gun fired at him; twice it followed him closely; the third time it caught him. A bullet struck him in the thigh and spun him round; he rolled a few yards down hill and lay there bleeding profusely and fainting.

When the shock passed, Derham found that, though dizzy from loss of blood and paralysed in the left leg, he could crawl. He thereupon continued his journey towards Saker, and presently was able to hobble on both legs, until he came, not upon Saker, but upon twenty men of his own company under Sergeant Crellin,²⁷ one of their platoon commanders. Crellin was an Australian militiaman, almost too stout of build for fighting in such country. But he was literally as cool as on a peace-time parade. Derham took over the command, and led his line forward through the dense scrub of Lone Pine beyond the Daisy Patch. Crellin was killed later in the fight.

Here at last he found lying in the scrub not indeed a firing line, but wounded men of every battalion in the 3rd Brigade. A sprinkling of unwounded men was amongst them. On his left were a few under Lieutenant Phillips²⁸ of Derham's own battalion. There was no semblance of a defensive organisation; the Turkish machine-gun bullets and shrapnel had torn to shreds whatever line had once been there. All that remained was the scattered débris of a previous advance, still holding out in the scrub. Derham's party joined a handful of men of the 1st Battalion with Lieutenant Cook²⁹ of the 2nd.

The 1st Battalion was the only one in the 1st Brigade whose companies had been directed onto the 400 Plateau. Before the last troops of the 2nd Brigade had landed, those of the 1st Brigade had begun to come ashore, and the 1st Battalion had been sent forward to reinforce MacLagan. Its leading companies reached him before his attention became focussed on Baby 700, and two of them, with their battalion machine-guns under Lieutenant Wootten,³⁰ were thrown into

²⁷ Sgt. N. C. Crellin (No 854, 5th Bn.); b. Caulfield, Melbourne, Vic., 23 Dec., 1894. Killed in action, 26 Apr., 1915.


²⁸ Captain A. J. Phillips; 5th Bn. Manufacturer's assistant, b. Albert Park, Melbourne, Vic., 30 Sept., 1894.

²⁹ Major G. S. Cook; 2nd Bn. Architect; son of Right Hon. Sir Joseph Cook, formerly Prime Minister of Australia; b. Chesterton, Staffs, Eng., 8 March, 1886.

³⁰ Lieut.-Col. G. F. Wootten, D.S.O., p.s.c. G.S.O. (2) 5th Aust. Div. 1918. Duntroon Graduate; of Mosman, Sydney, N.S.W.; b. Marrickville, Sydney, 1 May, 1893.

the fight on the plateau. Thither also the headquarters of the battalion under Colonel Dobbin eventually found their way. The men who were with Cook belonged either to one of these companies or to a part of the 2nd Battalion which had taken the same direction. He and Derham cannot have been far from The Cup and from Salisbury's later line, but they saw neither. Derham's orders were to find the firing line. He therefore sent forward a trustworthy scout, Private Pinkerton,³¹ upon the dangerous task of reconnoitring the forward slope of the plateau. After fifteen minutes Pinkerton came back with the news that no such line existed in front of them. The only sign of what might be a firing line was half-a-dozen Australians whom they now saw lying in rifle-pits scratched on the summit of Johnston's Jolly. Derham and Cook decided, in order to avoid loss, to send their men back singly round the head of Owen's Gully to join the group on the Jolly.

About twenty men were able to move. The wounded appealed piteously to be taken with them. But one of the common tragedies of this war was that, if men regarded the appeals of the wounded, they often failed in their duty to their side. A thousand times that day



it would have been easy to leave the firing line in order to help a wounded comrade to the rear, and during the later hours many men so acted. But Derham's men could not take their part in the fight if they carried wounded to the rear; their task was to reinforce the firing line with all possible speed. The wounded had to be left in the scrub, exposed to the danger of bullets and—what they feared more—of falling into the hands of the Turks. All the answer Derham could give to their appeals was that his men were retiring in order to advance again.

³¹ Pte. W. Pinkerton (No. 825, 5th Bn). Labourer; of Albert Park, Melbourne, Vic.; b. Brisbane, Q'land, 1 July, 1876. Killed in action, 25 Apr., 1915.

Derham's men withdrew as directed, and some of them, under their sergeant, Ghent,³² found their way to the party upon Johnston's Jolly. Derham and Cook, leaving after the rest had gone, unwittingly made too far southward. About the crest of the plateau they came suddenly upon a line of some 200 men in the scrub. This was the line of the 6th Battalion before-mentioned under Major Bennett and Major Wells.³³ It was at this time barring the southern end of the gap on the plateau. Some portion of Flockart's company of the 5th Battalion had diverged southwards and joined it.

The scrub on Lone Pine was so thick that the men of Fethers' company had been lost to view before Saker's company went over the crest. Like Saker, Fethers, finding no firing line, had advanced his company through the scrub in search of one. He was a young Victorian accountant, a man of high ideals and well beloved by his men. He had led his company some 200 yards beyond the crest, when he fell dead, shot by a sniper. But the company went on. Part of it under Lieutenant Ross³⁴ took a northerly direction onto Johnston's Jolly, and though Ross was hit, his men eventually, under some unknown officer, lined the edge of Wire Gully.

Another platoon of Fethers' company, under Lieutenant Hooper,³⁵ held straight on across the whole length of Lone Pine, still in search of a firing line and making for the Third ridge, which Hooper believed to be the objective. Gradually moving down over the southern shoulder of the plateau, they found themselves sheltered from the fiercest of the fire which swept the level surface of the Pine. As they approached its south-eastern edge, they heard rifle shots ahead. This, Hooper thought, must be at last the Australian firing line. From over the rim of the hill he saw a tent. A man of the 10th, lying wounded, warned him that it was a mark for Turkish bullets. Hooper's party made three more rushes, and on the


³² Captain L. Ghent; 3rd M.G. Coy. Of Brunswick, Melbourne, Vic.; b. West Melbourne, Vic., 21 June, 1895. Killed in action, 20 Sept., 1917.

³³ Major R. W. Wells; 6th Bn. Clerk; b. 24 March, 1878. Died of wounds, 11 May, 1915.

³⁴ Lieut.-Col. J. W. Ross, V.D.; 5th Bn. Bookkeeper in Vic. Govt. Railways; of South Melbourne and Coburg, Vic., b. Ballarat, Vic., 27 March, 1892.

³⁵ Captain R. M. F. Hooper; 5th Bn. Blacksmith's engineer in the Vic. Govt. Railways; of Albert Park, Melbourne, Vic., b. East Melbourne, Vic., 11 June, 1889. Killed in action, 9 Aug., 1915.

shoulder of the last southerly spur of Lone Pine (Pine Ridge), exactly at its junction with the Pine, they came suddenly upon a Turkish battery position. It had been deserted by the Turks, but several small guns were still in place. They were Hotchkiss guns—probably mountain-guns firing a 10-lb. shell. Behind them were emplacements built of pine logs, roofed over and heaped with clay. In these gun-pits Hooper's party sheltered. Of fifty men



who started with him only three reached the gun-pits; but Captain Daly³⁶ and some of the 6th had also arrived there. They garrisoned the old Turkish trench connecting the pits, and remained in it overlooking Legge Valley and facing the Third ridge. At intervals stray men from similar parties, hearing their voices on the south-eastern shoulder of the Pine, came down the slope and joined them.

Of the third company of the 5th Battalion—Flockart's—a portion, in moving on to the Jolly, came upon the body of Flockart's bosom companion, Major Fethers. Flockart dropped down beside it and covered his friend's face with his cap. Flockart was the only company commander of the 5th now left upon the plateau unwounded. He gradually formed a line of stray men of his own and other battalions some distance out upon the summit of Johnston's Jolly.


By this time, therefore, between noon and 1 p.m., something approaching a line had been established on the 400 Plateau and the spurs immediately south. The line was, however, not continuous; there was still a gap near the head of Owen's Gully. But north of this the 10th Battalion, with fragments of the 1st, 5th, and 7th, were strung out in unconnected lengths near the Australian edge of the plateau, with a line under Flockart some distance forward on Johnston's Jolly; south of the gap Wells had a definite line in rear of the crest, which was roughly continued on the spurs south

³⁶ Lieut.-Colonel C. W. D. Daly, D.S.O. Commanded 6th Bn. 1916/18; of Canterbury, Vic; b. Hobart, 5 May, 1890. Killed in action, 13 Apr., 1918

of the Pine by isolated bodies under Major Bennett of the 6th, Captain Whitham of the 12th, and some of the 8th. Similarly, some distance ahead of them, Salisbury and certain of the earliest troops upon the plateau were still lying in the scrub of the Pine.

The southern portion of the line—that under Wells—being behind the crest of the plateau, was invisible to the Turkish artillery, and was suffering only from stray shells and “over” bullets. But the part north of the gap was within sight of any Turkish observer on the heights of Battleship Hill. The forward elements were also within plain view of anyone upon Scrubby Knoll or the Third ridge. Had it been possible for the line to lie quietly in the scrub, its presence might not have been guessed. But so passive a rôle would have been impossible in such an enterprise as the landing, even if the troops who constantly arrived from the rear without any instruction to guide them had been aware of the need for concealment. By the constant sight of figures advancing on the plateau the Turks knew that the scrub at this place was peopled with the Australian troops. Several times the order to fix bayonets, given by some over strained or anxious officer, spread like fire along the line fringing the plateau, and the simultaneous flash of numerous points of glittering steel more than once betrayed the presence of the main line.

This brought into play a factor which from noon onwards was decisive in checking any further advance by the Australians and New Zealanders, and which by nightfall had worn them down to a point at which disaster was not impossible. That factor was the fire of the Turkish artillery. It has already been mentioned that, between 11 a.m. and noon, a battery of Turkish mountain-guns situated upon Scrubby Knoll began to play upon the 400 Plateau. There is some evidence that this battery opened at an earlier hour, bursting its shells





Col Marshall

Col Hobbs Capt Nicholson Lieut Ramsay

PART OF HEADQUARTERS 1ST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION LANDING FROM THE *Ribble* ABOUT
10 A.M., 25TH APRIL, 1915

Inst. H at Museum Official Photo No G904

To face p 300



Russell's Top

"Second" Ridge

Fork of Monash Valley (in distance)

Razor back

SHALLOW PITS SCRATCHED ON 25TH OR 26TH APRIL BY INFANTRY ON RAZORBACK NEAR THE MOUNTAIN GUNS THE LINE LAY FACING OUT OF THE PICTURE, WITH THE VALLEY IN ITS REAR AND SOME OF THE DISTANT HEIGHTS IN POSSESSION OF THE ENEMY

over Plugge's in an endeavour to reach the Beach. When, however, the 2nd Brigade was seen advancing on the plateau at a distance of less than a mile, the battery turned immediately upon it.

The men on the plateau formed a perfect target for the Turkish batteries. An Australian who so much as stood up could be seen by every Turkish artillery observer round nearly half the horizon. In front of a semicircle of heights, reaching from Battleship Hill to Gaba Tepe, the 400 Plateau stood out like the stage in a Greek amphitheatre. On that semicircle the Turks had by the middle hours of the day established at least four batteries. Of these, one—that at the southern end of the ridge where it joined Gaba Tepe—was firing upon the boats and the Beach; the other three fired upon the front line. The northernmost, from some position near Chunuk Bair high up in the folds of the main range, was shelling Baby 700, The Nek, and the slopes of Monash Valley; the centre battery, from the southern shoulder of Scrubby Knoll, was playing entirely upon the plateau; the third, near Anderson Knoll, a mile south of Scrubby Knoll, was in the first instance harassing chiefly the troops on Bolton's Ridge at the southern end of the line.

It was the two batteries near Chunuk Bair and upon Scrubby Knoll which were responsible for the greatest strain placed upon the nerves of the Australian troops that day. The former was in almost direct continuation of the Australian line upon the Second ridge; in military language, it completely enfiladed the line. When it lengthened its range (as it appears to have done at intervals) upon the troops lining the Second ridge, it could not miss them; every shot went home. The gunners had only to increase or shorten the range in order to play on the backs of the Australians on the Second ridge as a fireman plays with a hose.

To the battery upon Scrubby Knoll every movement of Australians in the scrub of the 400 Plateau was plainly visible at a range of less than a mile. The guns there began to play steadily on the plateau, not as with the whirlwind barrages in France, but incessantly hour after hour, the salvoes of four shells recurring every minute or half-minute as automatically as the shower of some giant garden-spray. The Turkish guns

in this battle fired nothing except shrapnel, but there was no cover from it. If men stood up to dig, they were swept by machine-guns. They were forced to lie flat, without trenches, on the open surface in the scrub, listening to the hail of each shrapnel-burst hissing through the shattered leaves, each man waiting for the burst which would end his suspense.

It was 11.30 a.m. when Colonel M'Cay reported that his troops on the plateau were under accurate fire from the north-east. Attempts were made at the various headquarters to guess the position of the guns by the direction of the pellets. Some of the advanced parties could see the Turkish guns on Scrubby Knoll and near Anderson Knoll, but though the position of the latter was reported again and again, the messengers were killed or wounded, and the messages lost or distorted. In the afternoon Colonel Weir and Captain Lorenzo of the 10th, near Wire Gully, thought that they could pick up the "flash" of a Turkish battery (the dust raised by the blast from their muzzles) near Scrubby Knoll. But for the most part neither the men who were suffering so heavily nor the headquarters behind them had any certain clue as to the directions from which the shellfire came.

There was thus no means of striking back at the weapon which was inflicting this torment. The ships' guns, upon which Churchill had counted with such complete assurance, were so useless in such a situation that they had almost ceased to fire. The naval officers and men were pathetically eager to help the infantry, but if they tried to direct their fire by observation from the ships, and shot at distant figures in khaki under the impression that they were Turks, they were likely to hit Australians. They did not even know where the front line was. The covering force carried a certain number of red and yellow flags, with which it was to mark its position for the benefit of the artillery, but these were far too certain an attraction for Turkish fire, and therefore were not shown. The *Queen*, when asked at noon to shell the Third ridge south of Scrubby Knoll, did not dare to do so for fear of hitting Australian troops. The young Australian officers appointed to direct from the shore the fire of the ships had landed early in the morning, but they could do scarcely anything. Communication with the ships was slow. Although a wireless

station was established at an early hour on the Beach, the messages were eventually transmitted almost entirely by hand signalling. The Navy knew that the infantry must be suffering under the fleecy shrapnel bursts which unfolded endlessly in the blue sky. But there was no sign of the Turkish batteries from which they came; they might have been anywhere on the whole flank of the mountain. The balloon ship and the seaplane gave no solution. It was no fault of the Navy that its guns could not fire over impossible angles at undiscoverable targets.

The Australian field artillery was not yet ashore. Colonel Hobbs, who landed at 10 a.m. and at once climbed up Plugge's Plateau to discover a position for his batteries, had as yet—about noon—found in those ridges no place for a single field-gun.³⁷ In the fighting before noon, except for the *Bacchante* trying hour after hour to silence one small battery upon Gaba Tepe, the landing force was completely unsupported by artillery. The infantry were thus struggling against a weapon which was out of their range. A deep catching of the breath, a cry after each shower of shrapnel, told where its pellets had gone home. The stream of wounded was incessant. The rest could only hold on, hoping—though without believing—that the torture would soon end.

At 10.30, however, the first of the two Indian Mountain Batteries, the 26th,³⁸ had begun to land. The brigade commander, an elderly Anglo-Indian officer, had been ashore early to reconnoitre; and when the 26th (Jacob's) Battery landed, the small guns—wheels, trail, and two parts of the barrel packed on a string of mules—wound up through the steep scrub of the Razorback, where it was ever afterwards camped, to a point on the 400 Plateau close behind the crest. Rafferty's platoon of the 12th Battalion, coming from the fight at Fisherman's Hut to escort the guns, met them on the Beach. The escort, originally fifty, was now reduced to Rafferty, a sergeant, and sixteen men. Nevertheless it marched

³⁷ Colonel Hobbs thought he could get guns up Rhododendron Spur if it were captured. Early in the afternoon he reported to Bridges that two field-guns could be placed on the left. Bridges asked that these should be brought ashore.

³⁸ Originally raised by an officer named Jacob in Beluchistan and generally known as Jacob's Battery.

with the battery to the plateau, and there, with three guns on either side of the head of White's Valley, at five minutes before noon, Jacob's Battery opened fire.

According to the plan this battery was to support from that position the attack of the 11th and 10th Battalions on Battleship Hill and Scrubby Knoll. The commander of the battery, Captain H. A. Kirby,³⁹ went forward to the firing line of the infantry at the head of Owen's Gully to direct the shooting of his guns. Down the slopes south of Scrubby Knoll—which the 10th were to have been attacking—almost opposite the plateau, he could see the Turks moving through the scrub. As the best means of supporting the Australian infantry on the plateau, he turned the fire of his six small guns upon the slopes of the Third ridge.

The mere sound of Kirby's battery close behind them came to the Australian infantry like a draught of cool water to one perishing from thirst. From end to end of the line it brought fresh heart to the men. But it could not last long. Although the position of the guns was screened from the Turks immediately ahead, Battleship Hill and the main heights to the north looked down upon it almost as the gallery of a theatre looks upon a stage. The battery had scarcely made its appearance there, when the Turkish battery in the folds of the main range was turned upon it. From then onwards the shrapnel seemed to concentrate upon these guns and upon the parts of the line about them. The British officers of the battery carried out their work exactly as if there were not a shrapnel shell in the air. Captain P. C. Chapman⁴⁰ was wounded in the forehead and shoulder. He was sent away and died in Egypt. Jemadar Dulla Khan, an Indian officer, was wounded. Ammunition was running short. At 1.7 p.m. Colonel Parker⁴¹ sent a message to Kirby in the front line telling him to come back to the guns. Kirby left Captain Whitting⁴² to observe, and went to the battery.

³⁹ Lieut.-Colonel H. A. Kirby, D.S.O., M.C., R.A. Of South Weald, Essex, Eng; b. Newnham, Hants., Eng, 18 Jan., 1881.

⁴⁰ Captain P. C. Chapman, R.A.; b. 10 March, 1884. Died of wounds, 2 May, 1915.

⁴¹ Brig.-General J. L. Parker, C.M.G., R.A. Of Harrow-on-the-Hill, Middlesex, Eng; b. London, Eng, 8 Jan., 1863.

⁴² Colonel E. Le G. Whitting, D.S.O., M.C., R.G.A. Of Weymouth, Eng; b. Stower Provost, Dorset, Eng, 5 Sept., 1881.

Between 1 and 2 o'clock the incessant fire upon the plateau and Bolton's Ridge was having its effect upon the infantry. The Turkish battery near Anderson Knoll had been attracted by the bark of the guns, and this part of the plateau was now being raked by a cross-fire from two directions. The line could be seen coming and going in front. After almost every retirement some brave man led it forward. But parties, or single men, finding themselves unsupported or in some place which seemed to their tortured brains a range mark for the enemy's shells, worked rearwards into the crevices behind the hillside and tended to straggle into the bottoms of the gullies behind the Australian line. Kirby, seeing this movement, became anxious for the safety of his guns. Rafferty's escort was now reduced by death and wounds to twelve; Kirby therefore moved him to the right rear of the guns, while he himself, with Sergeant-Major Piggott,⁴³ of the 5th Battalion, an old British soldier, rounded up what men they could from the valleys.

At 2.25 the Turkish shrapnel and rifle fire became more intense. Men were dropping every minute. At last Kirby, who had been wounded in the head but was still working, decided to withdraw the guns to shelter. The Turkish fire was far too deadly for him to bring up the mules; the valley behind was littered with dead animals. Consequently he ordered the guns' crews to drop part of the equipment, and to run the guns back off the plateau by hand. This was done. Guns, men, and mules were taken towards the Beach and there reorganized. When they came into action again in another position towards the end of the afternoon, only four of the six guns could be manned, and those with difficulty. Kirby, after working until he fainted through loss of blood, was sent to a hospital ship. Next day, finding her still off the Beach and a boat beside her about to leave, he slipped overboard and "deserted" back to his battery.

The same terrible hour which drove the mountain-guns from the 400 Plateau brought also the crisis of the battle for M'Cay's tormented infantry. It will be remembered that before noon certain portions of a line had been re-established on the

⁴³ S S M. F. E. Piggott, 5th Bn. Instructor in Aust. Permanent Forces; of Melbourne; b. St. Peters, Kent., Eng., 1 Sept., 1877. Died of wounds, 26 Apr., 1915.

plateau—north of the gap, the 10th and some of the 7th and 5th, with an advanced line under Captain Flockart; south of the gap, a line under Major Wells of the 6th, with Major Bennett on the spurs south of him and Major Salisbury in advance.⁴⁴ When it was heard that Saker had been wounded, a platoon of the 5th under Lieutenant Levy⁴⁵ was sent up to strengthen Flockart. This platoon and part of Carter's⁴⁶ "public school" company⁴⁷ of the 5th reached the line under Wells, and formed part of it at the moment when Lieutenants Derham and Cook (as related earlier in this chapter) fell back upon it.

Wells's line was behind the crest. It was subject to an occasional irritating fire intended for the troops in front and men and officers were under the strain of being condemned to see nothing and do nothing. But it had not been discovered by the Turks, and was suffering nothing comparable with the effects of the storm which swept the 400 Plateau. When Derham came into this haven out of the whirlwind on the summit, he, like Salisbury, was convinced that it was better to preserve the troops behind the crest than to have them slowly and uselessly exterminated on the summit of the plateau. There were thirty yards of fairly open hilltop in front of the line—a sufficient field of fire to allow it to beat off any Turkish attack. Derham strongly urged upon Wells the wisdom of keeping the line where it was.

Wells made his way southwards in order to find his senior in the line, Major Bennett. While he was away, some movement was noticed in the scrub forty yards ahead of the left of his line. Derham, who had just retired from that direction, knew that it was not caused by the Turks, and that probably it was due to some stray party of Australians. But the nerves of the line were tense. A shout went up—"There they are!" One excitable junior officer dashed forward, calling to the men to follow, and the left of Wells's line, including most of the "public school" company, rushed forward over the crest.

⁴⁴ These lines, although other officers also were prominent in them, are designated here by the names of those mentioned in the narrative.

⁴⁵ Captain L. Levy; 5th Bn. Barrister-at-law; b. St. James' Park, Hawthorn, Melbourne, Vic., 1 Jan., 1890.

⁴⁶ Major H. Carter; 5th Bn. Area officer; of Prahran, Melbourne, Vic.; b. Melbourne, 10 Feb., 1890.

⁴⁷ Half of this company was composed of old boys from the great public schools of Victoria.

Derham endeavoured to stop the men, but, as that proved impossible, he limped after them. Their advance was swift and it was some time before he came up with them. There happened exactly what had been foretold. The line, going over the crest, at once attracted every Turkish rifle or machine-gun within range. As it moved down the long glacis of the summit, over the Daisy Patch bare of any cover, the Turkish battery on Scrubby Knoll burst its shrapnel in rapid salvoes full in the face of the troops. Yet Derham had to hobble many hundreds of yards before he came on a fragment of them, under Lieutenant Levy, lying on the southern slope of Lone Pine along the spur later known as Weir Ridge.

Here Levy's men, though sheltered from the fire sweeping the crest of the Pine, were under a very heavy rifle fire from the right. Derham lay down beside Levy. Both realised only too well that the advance had been a fatal mistake. The organised line of a few minutes before was now scattered and dishevelled on the forward slope. It was impossible to stay where they were. While the two lay together talking, Derham, already seriously wounded, was hit by three more bullets: one struck his shoulder-strap, a second the revolver on which he lay, the third went through his shoulder without striking the bone. They were on an exposed knuckle overlooking all the land to the south—the Third ridge, the low country inland of Gaba Tepe, the Kilid Bahr Plateau a few miles beyond. From somewhere in that landscape came the fire which was raking them. Two hundred yards ahead, where the last southerly spur sprang from the high southern shoulder of the Pine, they could see Australians moving in some position which they were evidently defending.

Derham and Levy decided that their party was bound to be "cut up," whether it advanced or retired. It was better to die going forward than going back. The word was therefore given to advance, and the line went forward in one long rush down the 200 yards of slope. Derham, now twice wounded, struggled after it.

The Australians in front proved to be Captain Daly of the 6th and Lieutenant Hooper of the 5th, with some twenty men, in the Turkish mountain-battery position before mentioned. They were manning a trench which bent around a knuckle of

Pine Ridge overlooking Legge Valley, and which connected the gun-pits. In this trench Levy joined Hooper. In rear of the emplacements, in a small rectangular pit, was Daly with a few men. Derham almost fell into it. Excitement, the shock of his wounds, and the overwhelming toil and strain of the morning, had brought him nearly to the end of his tether. He asked for leave to sleep. Daly gave it, and the exhausted boy dropped at Daly's feet and slept where he fell.


Daly's party in the mountain-gun position on the south-east shoulder of the Pine, Corporal Harrison's a little to the north of them, and Haymen and Fortescue's party in the Krupp field-gun position near The Cup, were, so far as is known, the only bodies of Australians on Lone Pine which were not suffering such losses as made their extermination merely a matter of time. All of these were protected by their positions, which were slightly below the summit of the plateau and so were not swept by the fire which raked it. The position in the Turkish trench at The Cup—in a hollow overlooked from every side—was useless. During the afternoon Haymen was killed. Every military instinct in the officers urged that the right course was to abandon the wounded and order the survivors back over the hill. But no one made the decision, and they stayed on. On the other hand the position of Daly's men, overlooking Legge Valley, was tactically more valuable. It is true that they were under a constant sniping fire from Turks on the Third ridge. Of the thirty-five who formed the party more than half were wounded, but their trench, garrisoned by determined men, would not be easily taken from the front. The one great danger was that, if the enemy gained the summit of Lone Pine, which rose behind their left flank, they would be cut off without hope of retirement.

M'Cay was aware of this danger. Three of his battalions had established headquarters behind the line, and information was reaching him with fair regularity from each of them. The southern sector, on the right of the line, was commanded by Colonel Bolton of the 8th, who himself was acting mainly through Lieutenant-Colonels Field and Gartside, his juniors in the 8th Battalion, who were in its firing line on Bolton's Hill. The sector north of this, covering the northern part of Bolton's

Ridge and the southern portion of the 400 Plateau, was commanded by Colonel McNicoll of the 6th. The 6th and 7th were so intermingled, besides being confused with other battalions, that, since Elliott had been wounded, McNicoll really commanded both. He had his headquarters about a quarter of a mile in advance of M'Cay's, behind the northern end of Bolton's Ridge. A telephone line from M'Cay's headquarters was "through" to McNicoll by noon. Further still to the north, in White's Valley, behind the gap in the line on the plateau, were the headquarters of the 5th Battalion, with Captain Stewart⁴⁸ acting in command. The northern portion of the line on the plateau was supervised by Colonel Weir of the 10th, who was in touch, not with M'Cay, but with his own brigadier, Colonel MacLagan. MacLagan himself looked down on this part of the line from his headquarters on the high shoulder of MacLaurin's Hill, afterwards known as "Scott's Point."

The battalion commanders themselves had little notion as to where the elements of their battalions on the plateau and spurs ahead of them might be. The information reaching M'Cay was partial and vague. He was afraid for his right, though it was not threatened. But he also realised well the great danger from a Turkish attack upon the 400 Plateau. He knew that the spurs

which sprang from the south of Lone Pine were held by his troops, and that the arrival of Turks on the Pine would cut off their retreat. Nothing but rifle fire kept the Turks from the plateau, and he became aware that a great gap had opened in the line on which he depended to bar their way. This was probably due to the advance of Wells's line. At 12.50 p.m. M'Cay received a report from some part of his line which still existed on the



⁴⁸ Brig.-General J. C. Stewart, CMG, D.S.O. Commanded 14th Inf. Bde. 1918 Bank official; b Port Fairy, Vic., 19 Jan., 1884

plateau that it could not stand against the enemy's fire unless supported by artillery. "Am trying to dig," the message said, "but fire too hot. Very few men left."

The remainder of the 5th Battalion had by this time been thrown into the fight, and the only reserve which M'Cay possessed was the single company of the 1st Battalion which had strayed into White's Valley. He obtained leave from General Bridges to use it, and at 1.30 this company was put in. Not a man was now left in reserve to the 2nd Brigade. The gap in M'Cay's front was widened by the sending forward of part of the 8th Battalion from Bolton's Ridge. He urgently appealed to Bridges for further troops.

But this was the hour when reinforcements were becoming imperatively needed for Baby 700. Bridges was sending thither all the troops in his reserve except the 4th Battalion. He was unwilling to throw in the 4th until further units, either of the New Zealand infantry or of the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade, were landing. A message was sent to M'Cay ordering him to establish his brigade on the Second ridge, from Bolton's Ridge to the top of Owen's Gully ("which is practically your present position"), and there entrench.


But M'Cay's very difficulty was that the troops who had been holding that position had been led forward and were now scattered among the spurs and on the summit of Lone Pine, involved in a struggle from which no military machinery ever devised could have withdrawn them. At 3.30 he issued orders to his battalion commanders to establish the line laid down, but he warned Bridges that his brigade had lost greatly and would not be holding the line in satisfactory strength. If this truly represented the position, it was a serious matter indeed. But Bridges now had in his reserve no troops except the 4th Battalion, and during these hours of the afternoon the landing of further men had ceased. Bridges knew that the position on Baby 700 was critical, and the question was whether it was MacLagan or M'Cay who needed reinforcement the more imperatively. In the early afternoon he had sent a member of his own staff, Major Blamey, to M'Cay's headquarters. At 3.30 Blamey telephoned to Divisional Headquarters that M'Cay's need for reinforcements was extreme. Bridges promised that if a battalion were available it would

be sent. An hour elapsed, and still no such reinforcement reached M'Cay. He had striven to bridge the gap in his centre by making the 8th Battalion on Bolton's Hill extend as far as possible to its left. At 4.45 M'Cay telephoned to Divisional Headquarters. The reply came from Colonel White: "The General has only one battalion left; MacLagan has been very hard pressed, and the General is loth to dispense with this battalion until other troops come ashore to-night."

M'Cay answered that he could not manage to bridge the gap in his line; unless reinforcements arrived, the Turks might come through it at any moment. Major Blamey, standing beside M'Cay, added that in his opinion the situation was very dangerous—that some of the men were giving way.

A few minutes later the voice of Bridges came to M'Cay through the telephone. "M'Cay," he said, "I want you to speak to me, not as subordinate to general, but as M'Cay to Bridges. I have only one battalion left. Do you assure me that your need for it is absolute?" M'Cay replied that he did; unless it were sent to him, the Turks could come in behind the right of the line. Bridges promised him the 4th Battalion, and ordered Blamey to come down and lead it up. At 5 o'clock, when the battalion moved from Shrapnel Gully, there was not a man of the landing force left in reserve. The 4th Battalion arrived shortly before dusk at the northern end of Bolton's Ridge, to find a few overstrained men holding the crest. The 4th entrenched itself along the summit a little south of the 400 Plateau. Shortly afterwards the enemy began to creep up, gradually developing an attack which was maintained, with intervals, throughout the night.

With the arrival of the 4th Battalion at Bolton's Ridge, the gap, which had been greatly widened by the advance of Bennett and Wells, was again narrowed to a short space on top of the 400 Plateau. The officer upon whom in the end the task of bridging this gap mainly fell was Major Saker, of



the 5th Battalion, who had been wounded in the morning when his company first advanced onto Lone Pine. It has been mentioned that, about the time when Fethers was killed and Saker wounded, Captain Flockart had formed an advanced line on Johnston's Jolly. He managed to maintain this line until about 1 p.m., when the terrible fire of shrapnel upon the plateau was at its height. At that hour a message arrived from him at the battalion headquarters saying that, if he could not obtain reinforcements, he would have to withdraw his line and abandon his wounded. Captain Stewart (acting in command of the 5th) at once sent forward that part of the 5th—about a company, under Captains Carter and Luxton⁴⁹—which remained in reserve, and himself went forward with it.

As the company advanced under the hail of shell fire which met every movement, Flockart was seen retiring. He came in about 200 yards, bringing his wounded with him. Flockart himself was wounded in the jaw. Where he met Stewart the line stayed. Stewart and Carter were soon afterwards wounded by shrapnel. But Major Saker's ankle had now been dressed, and he climbed again onto the plateau and came upon the line at a point not far from the head of Owen's Gully.

The Lone Pine lobe of the 400 Plateau, on which M'Cay feared that the Turks might appear, was held during the whole of the afternoon by mere disorganised parties. Thomas, of the 9th, with his remnant still lay fifty yards in front of The Cup, suffering heavily from shrapnel, which had followed the parties of the 2nd Brigade as they advanced upon the Pine. Thomas's line now consisted entirely of men of the 2nd Brigade, 7th and 8th Battalions. At 3.30 his shoulder was smashed by shrapnel, and he left the line in charge of an officer of the 2nd Brigade. The same shellfire had driven Boase, Grills, Vowles⁵⁰ of the 12th, and others back from their advanced positions into the fluctuating movements upon the plateau, but their retirement was not closely followed by the enemy. The Australians were forced off the level surface of the upland only by the deadly fire which swept the scrub there. Every time the line retired, some gallant untiring

⁴⁹ Brigadier D. A. Luxton, C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D. Commanded 5th Bn. 1917/18. Clerk. of Hawthorn, Melbourne, Vic., b. Camberwell, Melbourne, 22 June, 1891.

⁵⁰ Captain A. S. Vowles, D.S.O.; 12th Bn. Subsequently appointed to permanent commission in Indian Army. Pearler, of Perth, W. Aust.; b. Kew, Melbourne, Vic., 27 Feb., 1891. Died 5 June, 1932.


leader would bring up reinforcements. With these, every time, remnants of the old line would go forward. They advanced in small sections by short rushes, flinging themselves down and scrambling on again. At every move the Turkish shrapnel crashed upon their backs. Tunics, breeches, putties were torn to ribbons in the bushes.

But very few of the enemy reached either lobe of the plateau. They massed behind Johnston's Jolly, in Legge Valley. Once, about 3 o'clock, a party of Australians, retiring from Lone Pine, found half a dozen Turks in rear of them at the head of Owen's Gully, and began to drive them towards the Australian line. At the same moment about a score of Turks appeared over the edge of the plateau. The Australian party had to drop into the scrub and to escape under cover of fire from its own line. With the exception of a few such minor encounters, the fight upon the 400 Plateau was never at close range, much less hand to hand.

The Turks were kept from its flat surface by a fire almost as deadly as that which swept the Australians, and thus the Australians in the mountain-gun pits and on the spurs south of the Pine were never called upon to face the greatest danger which could have threatened them—the possession of Lone Pine by the enemy.

It was during the later hours of the afternoon that Saker organised the line which finally bridged the gap. His first position was near the "Daisy Patch" in front of the crest—he himself moving ceaselessly up and down it. About 4.30 p.m. this line

was driven in. Saker reorganised it on the rear slope about the shallow head of White's Valley. He was a militia officer of the Connaught Rangers, but had been in Australia when war broke out. His own regiment (in which his brother was killed) was in France, and he at first desired to rejoin it, but his devotion to the 5th Battalion triumphed. He was a tall, slight man, a fine



cricketer, brimming with quiet humour. Most of the officers who were the leaders during the fight—among them Talbot Smith—had been hit, and at the end of the long day Saker gradually became the outstanding figure on the southern half of the 400 Plateau. His cheerful courage and energy caused the remnants of all battalions in the neighbourhood to look to him. Boase, who had been fighting all day upon Lone Pine; Whitham, returning wounded from the south; Rafferty, sent forward by Major Villiers-Stuart with the remnant of the gun escort—all gathered in Saker's neighbourhood, each collecting what men he could. The other parties on the summit of the plateau came in before dusk. Salisbury, wounded early in the morning, dazed, and exhausted, his line being now in charge of officers of the 2nd Brigade, made his way to a dressing-station and later rejoined a part of the 9th in reserve. Others retired onto Bolton's Ridge and even MacLaurin's Hill. By dusk the main line had withdrawn to the edge of the plateau. In parts it fringed the crest, elsewhere it was behind it. The summit, peopled only by the dead and dying, lay open to the Turks. Far out beyond it, in extreme peril but still holding fast, unconscious of the retirement of the line elsewhere, the men with Daly lay out in the mountain-gun pits, and a thin line of the 6th Battalion clung to the summit of Pine Ridge.

Of their fate the next chapter must tell.